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path: root/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c')
-rw-r--r--util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c39
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c b/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
index b5b9aeeb..61479b25 100644
--- a/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
+++ b/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ env_tmpdir(int bypass_all_sticky_checks, char **tmpdir,
int allow_noworld_unsticky;
int saved_errno = errno;
- char tmp[] = "/tmp";
- char vartmp[] = "/var/tmp";
+ static const char tmp[] = "/tmp";
+ static const char vartmp[] = "/var/tmp";
/* tmpdir is a user override, if set */
if (override_tmpdir == NULL)
@@ -238,26 +238,26 @@ env_tmpdir(int bypass_all_sticky_checks, char **tmpdir,
allow_noworld_unsticky = 0;
- if (world_writeable_and_sticky("/tmp",
+ if (world_writeable_and_sticky(tmp,
allow_noworld_unsticky,
bypass_all_sticky_checks)) {
if (tmpdir != NULL)
- *tmpdir = tmp;
+ *tmpdir = (char *)tmp;
errno = saved_errno;
- return "/tmp";
+ return (char *)tmp;
}
- if (world_writeable_and_sticky("/var/tmp",
+ if (world_writeable_and_sticky(vartmp,
allow_noworld_unsticky,
bypass_all_sticky_checks)) {
if (tmpdir != NULL)
- *tmpdir = vartmp;
+ *tmpdir = (char *)vartmp;
errno = saved_errno;
- return "/var/tmp";
+ return (char *)vartmp;
}
return NULL;
@@ -327,11 +327,11 @@ same_dir(const char *a, const char *b)
if (rval_scmp == 0)
goto success_same_dir;
- fd_a = fs_open(a, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+ fd_a = fs_open(a, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
if (fd_a < 0)
goto err_same_dir;
- fd_b = fs_open(b, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+ fd_b = fs_open(b, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
if (fd_b < 0)
goto err_same_dir;
@@ -513,6 +513,17 @@ sticky_hell:
* file ownership under hardened mode
* (only lets you touch your own files/dirs)
*/
+/*
+ TODO:
+ some variables e.g. template vs suffix,
+ assumes they match.
+ we should test this explicitly,
+ but the way this is called is
+ currently safe - this would however
+ be nice for future library use
+ by outside projects.
+ this whole code needs to be reorganised
+*/
int
mkhtemp(int *fd,
struct stat *st,
@@ -821,6 +832,12 @@ err:
}
#endif
+/* TODO: potential infinite loop under entropy failure.
+ * e.g. keeps returning low quality RNG, or atacker
+ * has control (DoS attack potential).
+ * possible solution: add a timeout (and abort if
+ * the timeout is reached)
+ */
int
mkhtemp_fill_random(char *p, size_t xc)
{
@@ -900,6 +917,8 @@ int secure_file(int *fd,
if (lock_file(*fd, flags) == -1)
goto err_demons;
+ /* TODO: why would this be NULL? audit
+ * to find out. we should always verify! */
if (expected != NULL)
if (fd_verify_identity(*fd, expected, &st_now) < 0)
goto err_demons;