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authorLeah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>2026-03-29 09:10:57 +0100
committerLeah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>2026-03-29 09:18:36 +0100
commitc2a70b7de0e15dc80d5b56d438a6d4ed47647b44 (patch)
tree5c5281bb789f0ea9ab1d8766f5cea6e7182d431b /util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
parent45edcf33f7d4b2f405c0f59fccc71b6ac15f5c65 (diff)
libreboot-utils: simplify random tmpdir namegen
generalise it in rand.c because this logic will be useful for other programs in the future. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c')
-rw-r--r--util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c52
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c b/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
index 61479b25..72942868 100644
--- a/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
+++ b/util/libreboot-utils/lib/mkhtemp.c
@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ mkhtemp_try_create(int dirfd,
struct stat st_open;
int saved_errno = errno;
int rval = -1;
+ char *rstr = NULL;
int file_created = 0;
int dir_created = 0;
@@ -636,8 +637,13 @@ mkhtemp_try_create(int dirfd,
if_err(*fd >= 0, EEXIST))
goto err;
- if (if_err_sys(mkhtemp_fill_random(p, xc) < 0) ||
- if_err_sys(fd_verify_dir_identity(dirfd, st_dir_initial) < 0))
+ /* TODO: potential infinite loop under entropy failure.
+ * if attacker has control of rand - TODO: maybe add timeout
+ */
+ memcpy(p, rstr = rchars(xc), xc);
+ free_and_set_null(&rstr);
+
+ if (if_err_sys(fd_verify_dir_identity(dirfd, st_dir_initial) < 0))
goto err;
if (type == MKHTEMP_FILE) {
@@ -765,6 +771,7 @@ mkhtemp_tmpfile_linux(int dirfd,
int tmpfd = -1;
size_t retries;
int linked = 0;
+ char *rstr = NULL;
if (fd == NULL || st == NULL ||
fname_copy == NULL || p == NULL ||
@@ -785,8 +792,8 @@ mkhtemp_tmpfile_linux(int dirfd,
for (retries = 0; retries < MKHTEMP_RETRY_MAX; retries++) {
- if (mkhtemp_fill_random(p, xc) < 0)
- goto err;
+ memcpy(p, rstr = rchars(xc), xc);
+ free_and_set_null(&rstr);
if (fd_verify_dir_identity(dirfd,
st_dir_initial) < 0)
@@ -832,43 +839,6 @@ err:
}
#endif
-/* TODO: potential infinite loop under entropy failure.
- * e.g. keeps returning low quality RNG, or atacker
- * has control (DoS attack potential).
- * possible solution: add a timeout (and abort if
- * the timeout is reached)
- */
-int
-mkhtemp_fill_random(char *p, size_t xc)
-{
- static const char ch[] =
- "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
-
- unsigned char scratch[64];
-
- size_t off = 0;
- size_t i;
-
- /* clamp rand to prevent modulo bias */
- size_t limit = 256 - (256 % (sizeof(ch) - 1));
-
- if (if_err(p == NULL, EFAULT))
- return -1;
-
-retry_rand:
- rset(scratch, sizeof(scratch));
-
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(scratch) && off < xc; i++) {
- if (scratch[i] < limit)
- p[off++] = ch[scratch[i] % (sizeof(ch) - 1)];
- }
-
- if (off < xc)
- goto retry_rand;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/* WARNING: **ONCE** per file.
*
* some of these checks will trip up