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authorLeah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>2024-06-22 22:57:39 +0100
committerLeah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>2024-06-22 22:57:39 +0100
commite67cd17164fd1934cd908b1f281867fac1cd73ae (patch)
treeb8f4a1677062c0a4cac3de45e12f5d28449da32c /config/grub/default/patches/0002-luks2/0003-Add-CC0-license.patch
parent71137b12b497e6935c81bf5fc73a0c17246fafd2 (diff)
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86
Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'config/grub/default/patches/0002-luks2/0003-Add-CC0-license.patch')
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