From eb32e4932738cb2901a5118c9e511c0191382388 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Chin Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2023 18:37:39 +0100 Subject: util/e6400-flash-unlock: restore README when nicholas added this, he removed the README because it's going on libreboot.org instead. however, i merged a WIP version of his page for now because i want to get the e6400 going in libreboot sooner. so, temp-readding this README. will just link to this on codeberg or something, from the lb docs NOTE: I didn't write this README, hence author field set in the commit. Nicholas wrote it, but I (Leah Rowe) am just adding it. so, git author set to nicholas, not me --- util/e6400-flash-unlock/README.md | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'util/e6400-flash-unlock') diff --git a/util/e6400-flash-unlock/README.md b/util/e6400-flash-unlock/README.md index 4100fde1..410a807a 100644 --- a/util/e6400-flash-unlock/README.md +++ b/util/e6400-flash-unlock/README.md @@ -1,4 +1,71 @@ +# Dell Latitude E6400 Internal Flashing -This documentation has become part of lbwww. See: +This utility allows you to use flashrom's internal programmer to program the +entire BIOS flash chip from software while still running the original Dell +BIOS, which normally restricts software writes to the flash chip. - +## TL;DR +Run `make` to compile the utility, and then run `sudo ./e6400_flash_unlock` and +follow the directions it outputs. + +## How it works +There are several ways the firmware can protect itself from being overwritten. +One way is the Intel Flash Descriptor (IFD) permissions. On Intel systems, the +flash image is divided into several regions such as the IFD itself, Gigabit +Ethernet (GBE) non-volative memory, Management Engine (ME) firmware, Platform +Data (PD), and the BIOS. The IFD contains a section which specifies the +read/write permissions for each SPI controller (such as the host system) and +each region of the flash, which are enforced by the chipset. + +On the Latitude E6400, the host has read-only access to the IFD, no access to +the ME region, and read-write access to the PD, GBE, and BIOS regions. In order +for flashrom to write to the entire flash internally, the host needs full +permissions to all of these regions. Since the IFD is read only, we cannot +change these permissions unless we directly access the chip using an external +programmer, which defeats the purpose of internal flashing. + +However, Intel chipsets have a pin strap that allows the flash descriptor +permissions to be overridden depending on the value of the pin at power on, +granting RW permissions to all regions. On the ICH9M chipset on the E6400, this +pin is HDA\_DOCK\_EN/GPIO33, which will enable the override if it is sampled +low. This pin happens to be connected to a GPIO controlled by the Embedded +Controller (EC), a small microcontroller on the board which handles things like +the keyboard, touchpad, LEDs, and other system level tasks. Software can send a +certain command to the EC, which tells it to pull GPIO33 low on the next boot. + +Although we now have full access according to the IFD permissions, we still +cannot flash the whole chip, due to another protection the firmware uses. +Before software can update the BIOS, it must change the BIOS Write Enable +(BIOSWE) bit in the chipset from 0 to 1. However, if the BIOS Lock Enable (BLE) +bit is also set to 1, then changing the BIOSWE bit triggers a System Management +Interrupt (SMI). This causes the processor to enter System Management Mode +(SMM), a highly privileged x86 execution state which operates transparently to +the operating system. The code that SMM runs is provided by the BIOS, which +checks the BIOSWE bit and sets it back to 0 before returning control to the OS. +This feature is intended to only allow SMM code to update the system firmware. +As the switch to SMM suspends the execution of the OS, it appears to the OS +that the BIOSWE bit was never set to 1. Unfortunately, the BLE bit cannot be +set back to 0 once it is set to 1, so this functionality cannot be disabled +after it is first enabled by the BIOS. + +Older versions of the E6400 BIOS did not set the BLE bit, allowing flashrom to +flash the entire flash chip internally after only setting the descriptor +override. However, more recent versions do set it, so we may have hit a dead +end unless we force downgrade to an older version (though there is a more +convenient method, as we are about to see). + +What if there was a way to sidestep the BIOS Lock entirely? As it turns out, +there is, and it's called the Global SMI Enable (GBL\_SMI\_EN) bit. If it's set +to 1, then the chipset will generate SMIs, such as when we change BIOSWE with +BLE set. If it's 0, then no SMI will be generated, even with the BLE bit set. +On the E6400, GBL\_SMI\_EN is set to 1, and it can be changed back to 0, unlike +the BLE bit. But there still might be one bit in the way, the SMI\_LOCK bit, +which prevents modifications to GBL\_SMI\_EN when SMI\_LOCK is 1. Like the BLE +bit, it cannot be changed back to 0 once it set to 1. But we are in luck, as +the vendor E6400 BIOS leaves SMI\_LOCK unset at 0, allowing us to clear +GBL\_SMI\_EN and disable SMIs, bypassing the BIOS Lock protections. + +There are other possible protection mechanisms that the firmware can utilize, +such as Protected Range Register settings, which apply access permissions to +address ranges of the flash, similar to the IFD. However, the E6400 vendor +firmware does not utilize these, so they will not be discussed. -- cgit v1.2.1