<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>lbmk.git/config/coreboot/kcma_d8-udimm_16mb, branch master</title>
<subtitle>libreboot build system (LibreBoot MaKe)
</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://browse.libreboot.org/lbmk.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>coreboot/fam15h: only use this, for amd boards</title>
<updated>2024-08-10T17:24:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leah Rowe</name>
<email>leah@libreboot.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-10T17:24:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://browse.libreboot.org/lbmk.git/commit/?id=80c3f9395dd9b49e6a82a79b42e109f0f0e5f890'/>
<id>80c3f9395dd9b49e6a82a79b42e109f0f0e5f890</id>
<content type='text'>
it is identical to fam15h_rdimm, with _udimm now removed;
the latter had a patch that added certain behaviour only
intended for rdimm, but the patch in question breaks various
configurations.

raminit has always been unreliable on these boards. i'd rather
simplify it all, in lbmk. i'll probably update this to the dasharo
tree later on, specificalyl for kgpe-d16

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
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<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
it is identical to fam15h_rdimm, with _udimm now removed;
the latter had a patch that added certain behaviour only
intended for rdimm, but the patch in question breaks various
configurations.

raminit has always been unreliable on these boards. i'd rather
simplify it all, in lbmk. i'll probably update this to the dasharo
tree later on, specificalyl for kgpe-d16

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>coreboot: set build_depend on target.cfg files</title>
<updated>2024-07-06T10:34:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leah Rowe</name>
<email>leah@libreboot.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-06T05:34:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://browse.libreboot.org/lbmk.git/commit/?id=c241a3ef485fcfde06f60abaf7e16bc5c549e53b'/>
<id>c241a3ef485fcfde06f60abaf7e16bc5c549e53b</id>
<content type='text'>
set a default one in mkhelper.cfg

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
set a default one in mkhelper.cfg

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86</title>
<updated>2024-06-22T21:57:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leah Rowe</name>
<email>leah@libreboot.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-22T21:57:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://browse.libreboot.org/lbmk.git/commit/?id=e67cd17164fd1934cd908b1f281867fac1cd73ae'/>
<id>e67cd17164fd1934cd908b1f281867fac1cd73ae</id>
<content type='text'>
Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload.

These options have been removed from target.cfg handling:

* seabios_withgrub
* grub_withseabios

The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as
the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set.

The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by
default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available).

Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to
make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size
and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues
similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me
that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload.

SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due
to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it
is simply far less likely to break.

If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not
bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload.

Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary
payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that
will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing,
so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user
wants to use a GRUB payload.

You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS
by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at
runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS
documentation says how to do this.

Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add
a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB
from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the
disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel
graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits
as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password
and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide.

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload.

These options have been removed from target.cfg handling:

* seabios_withgrub
* grub_withseabios

The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as
the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set.

The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by
default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available).

Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to
make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size
and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues
similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me
that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload.

SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due
to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it
is simply far less likely to break.

If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not
bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload.

Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary
payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that
will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing,
so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user
wants to use a GRUB payload.

You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS
by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at
runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS
documentation says how to do this.

Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add
a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB
from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the
disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel
graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits
as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password
and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide.

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>grub: only enable nvme if needed on a board</title>
<updated>2024-06-11T23:58:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leah Rowe</name>
<email>leah@libreboot.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-11T23:58:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://browse.libreboot.org/lbmk.git/commit/?id=0b37653ab908093a108cfe3cbcb4e8d378428d26'/>
<id>0b37653ab908093a108cfe3cbcb4e8d378428d26</id>
<content type='text'>
remove nvme support from the "default" grub tree

now there are three trees:

* default: no xhci or nvme patches
* nvme: contains nvme support
* xhci: contains xhci and nvme support

this is in case a bug like lbmk issue #216 ever occurs
again, as referenced before during lbmk audit 5

there is no indication that the nvme patch causes any
issues, but after previous experience i want to be sure

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
remove nvme support from the "default" grub tree

now there are three trees:

* default: no xhci or nvme patches
* nvme: contains nvme support
* xhci: contains xhci and nvme support

this is in case a bug like lbmk issue #216 ever occurs
again, as referenced before during lbmk audit 5

there is no indication that the nvme patch causes any
issues, but after previous experience i want to be sure

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>do not allow dashes in coreboot target names</title>
<updated>2024-05-29T02:15:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leah Rowe</name>
<email>leah@libreboot.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-29T02:15:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://browse.libreboot.org/lbmk.git/commit/?id=e7cb10d68b46bd4efb9a87c36d337f8a4fe1e24c'/>
<id>e7cb10d68b46bd4efb9a87c36d337f8a4fe1e24c</id>
<content type='text'>
Command: ./vendor download kcma-d8-rdimm_16mb

Output was:

include/lib.sh: line 115: kcma-d8-rdimm=config/vendor: No such file or directory

That will have to be audited later on, but the recent
more stringent error checking in vendor.sh triggered
this previously untriggered error message. The error
was in fact already occuring before, silently.

Anyway, mitigate by renaming all coreboot targets so
that they do not contain hyphens in the name. This
should avoid triggering errors in that eval command,
on line 115 in lib.sh

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Command: ./vendor download kcma-d8-rdimm_16mb

Output was:

include/lib.sh: line 115: kcma-d8-rdimm=config/vendor: No such file or directory

That will have to be audited later on, but the recent
more stringent error checking in vendor.sh triggered
this previously untriggered error message. The error
was in fact already occuring before, silently.

Anyway, mitigate by renaming all coreboot targets so
that they do not contain hyphens in the name. This
should avoid triggering errors in that eval command,
on line 115 in lib.sh

Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe &lt;leah@libreboot.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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